Private censorship
(Book)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

My goal in this book is to slow down and ask some basic questions: What is censorship and why does it strike us as a grave problem? Is censorship the right concept for thinking about the above phenomena, or are complaints couched in the language of censorship confused, perhaps conceptually? Supposing that there is no confusion, what rights do the new censors have and do they act within those rights when they act in the ways described above? Supposing that they do act within their rights, is their behavior beyond reproach? And if it isn't, what exactly is wrong with it? Answering these questions is crucial for addressing a further question: What should be done about all of this? Do existing executive and legislative proposals represent a wise course of action? Or are they hastily drawn and likely to make matters worse? In addressing these questions, I'll begin at the beginning, with an account of censorship and the reasons it is morally and politically troubling. With this account on the table, we'll seethat thinking of the cases above in terms of censorship is perfectly above board. This is in part because private censorship can threaten our ability to realize an intellectual environment we have reason to value, if we value free speech. Despite this, questions about the proper response to private censorship are far from straightforward. For although private parties and states can both act as censors, their censorship affects others in importantly different ways. And those differences mean a great deal for determining the duties of citizens, executives, and legislators. Before we begin, it is worth flagging a methodological point. In the remainder of this chapter, I will be asking you to consider various examples in the service of clarifying concepts oreliciting normative judgments. In discussing these examples, I will be making normative judgments of my own. You will read me saying things like, "such and such is clearly wrong" or "so and so is clearly permissible." It is a background supposition of this work that such judgments can be true or false, and that they are no mere matters of opinion. But I will often be unable to argue for the judgments on which I rely. Rather, I invite you to think about the cases yourself and exercise your own judgment. Ifit departs from mine, think about why that is. If you can't shake the feeling that I've gone wrong, great! That's how valuable philosophical exchanges are born.